The Formula That Failed: Why Tucho’s Note Does Not Excommunicate You

On July 2, 2026, the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith released two documents concerning the previous day’s episcopal consecrations by the Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX): a Decree and an accompanying Explanatory Note (Note). Commentary since has treated the two as a single act, as though the DDF had excommunicated six bishops, seven hundred priests, and an unknown number of laity in one stroke. It did not.

Fernandez and company released a set of documents outlining the procedure for not only SSPX clerics, but members of the faithful to “return to full communion” with the Church. We will discuss that at the end of this and how it is as dubious, if not legally flaccid, as the Decree and the Note.

Read against the actual canons the Code supplies for the imposition and declaration of penalties, the Decree does one thing and the Note does another, and only the Decree has any penal teeth at all, questions about the validity of the penalties notwithstanding, which will be dealt with elsewhere, and are outside the scope of this essay.

So, did this particular act, as drafted, actually do what many assume it did? The answer, canon by canon, is no.

Before we continue, this essay is strictly concerned with the legal, rather the illegal, reality before us, and is not an apologetic for the Society as such. I have done that, and will continue to do that, in other writings. But, here we are concerned merely with the legal question and will attempt to deal with it on the firm foundation of the Code of Canon Law.

Yes, I am biased and in favour of the SSPX, but a man who loves something will defend that thing. If my reasoning stands, then it stands, regardless of what you think about me or the Society.

Some may retort that I am not a Canon Lawyer — this is true — but the Code of Canon Law (Code) is not a gnostic document which requires special powers to unlock. It is logical, formulaic, and there is a wealth of canonical information available for anyone to read. In addition, I have consulted relevant experts for the sake of writing this, and they will remain anonymous for the sake of their professional credibility in their work as Canon Lawyers.

Also, in each section, I will ensure to provide the most accessible explanations in layman’s terms possible to ensure that the general reader can understand.

“Nolite timere! Codex vere est amicus vester!” “Do not be afraid! The Code is truly your friend! Or at least it’s supposed to be!”

What the Decree Actually Does

Six men are named in the Decree: the four bishops consecrated on July 1, Bishop Alfonso de Galarreta as the principal consecrator, and Bishop Fellay as the co-consecrator. The charge against the four newly consecrated bishops rests on can. 1387, which governs episcopal consecration without pontifical mandate:

“A bishop who consecrates some person a bishop without a pontifical mandate, and the person who receives the consecration from him, incur a latae sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See.”

The canon, strictly speaking, binds the consecrator and the one consecrated, under the same penalty. Fellay, however, is charged only under can. 1364 §1, the general schism provision:

“An apostate from the faith, a heretic, or a schismatic incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.”

So, according to the Code, consecration of bishops without a mandate is a penalty worthy of excommunication, and, notably, the Code does not de facto apply the penalty of schism for such an act. It is the opinion of Fernandez that this act is inherently schismatic, which follows the logic of John-Paul II who wrote in Ecclesia Dei Adflicta (which is referenced as source material for the decision in the Note):

“In itself, this act was one of disobedience to the Roman Pontiff in a very grave matter and of supreme importance for the unity of the church, such as is the ordination of bishops whereby the apostolic succession is sacramentally perpetuated. Hence such disobedience - which implies in practice the rejection of the Roman primacy - constitutes a schismatic act.”

As will be seen below, it has not been the practice of the Church for almost 40 years to actually consider the priests and bishops of the SSPX as schismatic, and it is dubious to suggest that a single act of canonical disobedience to the Pope would constitute the offence of schism. Disobeying an order or command does not entail the rejection of the Roman primacy; it is merely disobedience, and the act must be judged on its own merit, because it is not the case that a single act of disobedience to any authority, even the Pope, is indicative of a fundamental rejection of said authority. John-Paul II seems to understand this, yet ignores it. He admits that it is an act of disobedience inherently, then makes a logical leap to a conclusion not found in the premise that a practical rejection of the “Roman primacy” is implied.

Notice the language used, “rejection of the Roman primacy.” That is a very grave accusation and goes beyond the scope of the act. The canon used to describe the sin of schism is can. 751, which states: “...Schism is the withdrawal of submission to the Supreme Pontiff or from communion with the members of the Church subject to him.”

Storied Canon Lawyer, Father Denzil Meuli, now deceased, once commented on this phenomenon:

“The relevant canon is 751. The defining word in that canon is detrectatio, by which is meant a refusal of all submission. It is precisely this all-encompassing rejection which differentiates schism from disobedience.”

The Latin term detrectatio has been adopted by the Church because of its perennial meaning, which is rooted in usage referring to things like refusing or retreating from military service, or formally stepping away from a principled belief.

In laymen’s terms, it is the difference between saying, “No” to a commanding officer and leaving the military dishonourably; or, saying in a particular circumstance that a principle does not bind due to the conflict with a higher principle, and giving up the principle entirely.

John-Paul II, if he were a military commander, would seem to have assumed that saying “No” was equivalent to going AWOL. Or, that saying to the Holy Father, “I believe in your authority, but I cannot do this thing that you have asked me to do, or must do this thing you have asked me not to do,” is equivalent to saying, “You have no power over me.”

This is how a Marxist Despot rules, and is not how the Successor of Saint Peter is supposed to act.

Importantly, both canons describe latae sententiae penalties, meaning penalties incurred automatically by the act itself. But an automatic penalty and a declared penalty are not the same thing, and the difference matters enormously for what follows.

The Mechanism for Declaring a Latae Sententiae Penalty

Two Entirely Different Things Happening in Canon Law

1. Incurring a penalty ipso facto (de facto, “automatically”)

A latae sententiae penalty is one that attaches to the person the moment he commits the delict, by the force of the law itself, with no human intervention required. All of this assumes the person is guilty in the first place.

Can. 1314 explains the distinction:

“A penalty is usually ferendae sententiae, so that it does not bind the guilty party until it has been imposed; it is latae sententiae, however, so that it is incurred ipso facto when the delict is committed, if the law or precept expressly establishes this.”

So the moment a bishop consecrates another bishop without pontifical mandate, if all the conditions of can. 1387 and the imputability requirements of cann. 1323-1324 are actually met in that man’s particular case; the excommunication exists. It exists in the internal forum.

This is similar to how we view law in civil society, or general morality for that matter, as when one, for example, steals bread, we would consider him to be guilty of theft, but he still must be dealt with by the courts, assuming he is apprehended, to see if he is actually guilty of a crime when taking the logic of the law into account.

We would do well to follow Thomas Aquinas to understand how one can commit a crime in one instance, but the same action by the same man or a different man in a different setting would not constitute a crime.

The following consideration is based on the Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae (II-II), Question 66, Article 7: “Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?”

In extreme necessity, all things become common. There is a difference between ordinary circumstances and extraordinary circumstances wherein there is a grave necessity.

He writes:

“If the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.”

The logic is that human ordinances (like property law) — Canon Law is human law, and not divine, or eternal — cannot derogate from natural or divine law, and that positive law regarding property was instituted to serve human need, not override it in cases of necessity:

“Whatever certain persons have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor... Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent...”

He comments further:

“It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case of extreme need: because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.”

The passages from Aquinas demonstrate that an act itself does not make someone guilty of a crime associated with that act generally. The only exception would be in cases where the act is intrinsically evil. The consecration of bishops without a mandate is not intrinsically evil, or schismatic, as the historical record attests. For a detailed explanation on how a State of Necessity could apply, which is not discussed in depth here, can be read here.

Whether or not a man is truly guilty of a crime covered under a latae sententiae censure is not known to the public at the time of the act, and is only fully known to God and perhaps, imperfectly, in the man’s conscience. Canonically, it has not yet been established as a matter of external, binding record for anyone else, including the man himself in the external forum, including the Church’s own governance.

2. The penalty being declared

Declaration requires: notification of the accused, an actual opportunity to answer the charge and raise defenses (including the exempting circumstances of 1323-1324 — ignorance, fear, necessity, and so on), a finding of certainty about both the external act and its imputability, and a decree stating the reasons in fact and in law. Only after this has it become binding as a matter of external ecclesiastical record, invocable by third parties, enforceable in practice, and listed in official acts.

Now, the Code does not leave the declaration of an already-incurred censure to an informal announcement. Can. 1720 sets out the procedure an Ordinary must follow to move from “this penalty exists in law” to “this penalty is now a matter of binding external record”:

“If the Ordinary considers that the matter must proceed by extrajudicial decree: he is to inform the accused of the accusation and the proofs, giving an opportunity for self-defense... he is to weigh carefully all the proofs and arguments with two assessors... if the delict is certain and the criminal action is not extinguished, he is to issue a decree, expressing at least summarily the reasons in law and in fact.”

Can. 1341 supplies the governing principle behind this caution:

“An ordinary must take care to initiate a judicial or administrative process to impose or declare penalties only after he has ascertained that fraternal correction, rebuke, or other means of pastoral solicitude cannot sufficiently repair the scandal, restore justice, and reform the offender.”

Nothing comparable was done for the priests of the Society or for the laity attached to it.

We could argue the same is the case for how the Bishops were warned, because a couple of short, vague public statements, and an invitation to “dialogue” which is not a legal mechanism, are insufficient.

Regarding the priests, no accusation was communicated to each man individually; no opportunity for defence was offered; no decree “expressing the reasons in law and in fact” was issued naming any of the more than seven hundred by name. What exists instead, for everyone outside the six, is the Note.

As we will see below, the Note does absolutely nothing, legally speaking.

The Practical Importance of These Distinctions Regarding the Priests of the SSPX

According to can. 1331 §1, a person who has received, legitimately, such a penalty is: barred from the sacraments, from exercising office, from ecclesiastical acts of governance.

Now, for the faithful, can. 1335 §2 is vital:

“If a latae sententiae censure has not been declared, the restriction is also suspended whenever a member of the faithful requests a sacrament or sacramental or an act of governance; a person is permitted to request this for any just reason.”

The notion of “just reason” is open-ended. Wanting to go to Heaven is probably the most just reason you can have to do anything in this life. So, wanting to avoid heresy, to ensure sacramental validity, worship God reverently, and participate in the sacred traditions of your ancestors since time immemorial are all just reasons. In fact, even John-Paul II would agree, when he called the attachment that many Catholics have to the traditions of the Church “rightful aspirations” in Ecclesia Dei Adflicta, 5c. “Rightful” is a synonym for “just”, and, in fact, “rightful” is narrower, and “just” is broader. Ergo, following John-Paul II’s logic, it is “just” in nature to desire even more than is listed in this regard in the aforementioned document, which only speaks of liturgical and disciplinary traditions. It is therefore just to seek out more than that, namely, the perennial doctrine of the Church, which is hard to come by in the normal parish.

So, an undeclared latae sententiae censure — even a real one, even one that genuinely exists in the internal order — does not stop the faithful from validly and licitly requesting the sacraments from the censured minister, for any just cause.

The same objective fact — a man has incurred excommunication — produces radically different practical and canonical consequences depending on whether it has crossed from the first category into the second. This, of course, assumes validity in the first place.

Why the Note Cannot Do What Is Being Claimed For It

The Code recognizes a limited set of instruments by which the Church binds: law (cann. 7-22, 29ff.), general executory decree (cann. 31-33), singular decree, penal precept (can. 1319), judicial sentence, or declaratory decree under can. 1720. An explanatory note fits none of these categories. It was not promulgated as law. It carries no executory clause. It does not purport to be a penal precept threatening a specific penalty for a specific future act. It is, as its own title says, explanatory: a doctrinal gloss accompanying the Decree, not an independent juridical act.

This distinction is vitally important. Can. 18 requires strict interpretation of anything that establishes a penalty or restricts the free exercise of rights:

“Laws which establish a penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are subject to strict interpretation.”

Strict interpretation does not mean what it sounds like in colloquial speech. When we think of something being “strict,” we generally think of being heavy-handed. In the canonical tradition, the opposite meaning is understood. Meaning, we have to adhere strictly to what something says, legally speaking, and cannot extend beyond the scope of the law. And, since a Note is not a legal function, we cannot apply its meaning, as if it were law, to the Decree.

This means:

• The law means exactly what it says, no more and no less.

• Penalties apply only in the cases explicitly covered.

• Any ambiguity is resolved in favour of the accused/restricted party, not against them.

• Excusing circumstances must be presumed operative unless positively proven otherwise.

This is the direct opposite of the instinct to read penal canons broadly and extend their application by inference or analogy.

In the case of the SSPX, for example, this means that any talk of schism or excommunication can only apply to those specifically named in a particular ruling, and not extend to all those associated with the Society, if even the Note says otherwise. And, unless it can be proven that excusing circumstances do not apply, they must be presumed to be operative. So, when we consider that Canons 1323–1325 provide guidance on how one could be exempt specifically from penalties associated with the unapproved consecrations of bishops, we must allow for those exemptions, even if we do not agree with them personally. If we fail to do so, we are not consistently following the logic of the Code and the Church’s canonical norms.

Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that John-Paul II’s or Cardinal Fernandez’s assessment were correct by the letter of the law, that does not constitute the whole story, legally speaking. The situation in 1988, and the present Decree are limited in scope and do not tell the whole story.

• They judge a particular act — the consecrations themselves — not a category of persons.

• They do not judge the Society as an institution to be in schism. In each case, it is only stated as a fact taken for granted, that formally adhering to an undeclared schism would be sinful. To extend his judgment to cover “the SSPX” or “all who attend SSPX Masses” is to make a judgment that is illegal — and to make oneself, in effect, a greater judge than the legislator or the Code.

• They do not address the excusing clauses. Canons 1323 through 1325 provide a substantial list of circumstances — including necessity, fear, and even incorrectly but sincerely believed necessity — that would eliminate or reduce the canonical penalty. The documents do not mention these canons, which means the judge did not rule them inapplicable. Under the principle of strict interpretation (Canon 18), if the judge did not explicitly exclude the excusing clauses, they cannot simply be assumed to have been ruled out.

Now, we should also mention, that in 1988, the Motu Proprio released by John-Paul II was not actually the Decree that expressed excommunication of the bishops involved. That Decree was released on July 1, 1988, by Cardinal Gantin, and is essentially identical to the one released July 2, 2026, in that it names the bishops, and warns the priests and laity. John-Paul II’s letter was, in essence, his own Note, yet more extensive and verbose. We have been referencing John-Paul II’s Motu Proprio for context, since it is referenced numerous times in the present Note, and most people are more familiar with it.

When a penal canon is at issue, the excusing clauses are not optional considerations. The law must be understood as a whole, and rulings cannot arbitrarily ignore relevant legal principles. A judge who applies a penalty without addressing whether the excusing circumstances exist has rendered an incomplete judgment — he has not disposed of the whole case.

Not uncommon amongst general commentary on the Society situation is something like this: “The pope (or in this case, the cardinal) didn’t say the excusing circumstances applied, therefore they don’t apply.” However, from a canonical perspective, this is backwards. Under strict interpretation of penal laws, the burden runs the other direction entirely. The excusing circumstances are presumed operative unless they are positively proven not to apply. If a judge is silent, this does not constitute an elimination of the principles related to the circumstances. Therefore, if the judge remains silent on them, the question of whether they apply remains open.

The Grammar of the Two 2026 Documents Is Damning

Now, there are inconsistencies that are genuinely damaging to the Dicastery’s own position; they deserve consideration, because they may actually nullify aspects of the Decree as such.

The Decree, addressing itself to the wider body of clergy and faithful attached to the Society, does not tell them they are excommunicated. It warns them. Read it carefully.

The formula used is that those who adhere to the schism would incur, ipso facto, the penalty of excommunication latae sententiae. In case you are wondering if this is a mistranslation, it is not. In Italian, it says incorrerebbero, which means “would incur.” I am fluent in Italian, and I can attest to this meaning.

Grammatically, this is a conditional protasis pointed at a future, eventual act: if you do this thing, this is what will follow. It refers to the “if” clause in a conditional statement that sets up a condition (e.g., “If it rains,” in the sentence “If it rains, the game is canceled”).

It is the language of a warning sign, not a verdict. The penalty is being held out as a consequence that attaches to conduct not yet judged to have occurred, or at least not yet judged in the form the Code requires.

Translation: there has been no judgment that the priests have incurred the excommunication, which, in any event, cannot be declared under these circumstances to a group of people as such, because each one has to be named.

The Note, issued the same day, under the same heading, over the same signatures, does not use this language at all. It shifts without explanation into the indicative and the present: the ministers of the Society are in schism, and must be considered schismatics, subject to a censure already provided by law.

So, the Note takes the Decree and extends the penalties, which do not exist in the case of the priests, to the whole group of priests as such, yet they are not condemned in the Decree, and the Note cannot condemn them. It is a legal fiction, and a vile one at that.

We have two texts from one date with one set of signatures that present incompatible grammar and contradict one another. The Note condemns where the Decree does not, yet the Note cannot condemn at all. So, the head of the DDF is telling the world, in a document that can do no such thing, that more than seven hundred men have been excommunicated, when they have not been, according to his own Decree.

This is insanity.

Can. 18 tells us how to resolve a contradiction of exactly this kind. Where the two texts disagree, the resolution must favour the instrument that actually possesses penal form, which is the Decree, and it must favour the narrower reading, which is the conditional. A note cannot, by asserting something as already true, retroactively convert a warning about future conduct into a declaration of present censure; that would be extending a penal provision by inference, which is precisely what strict interpretation forbids.

Furthermore, any talk of the laity being excommunicated because of what is said in the Decree is also fiction.

You Cannot Excommunicate a Group This Way

Even if we were to assume that a Note could do what it cannot do, a latae sententiae excommunication is never incurred by class membership.

Can. 1321 §1 makes gravely imputable violation, by malice or culpability, the condition for any penalty binding at all:

“No one can be punished unless the external violation of a law or precept, committed by the person, is gravely imputable by reason of malice or of culpability.”

In laymen terms, we should understand this logic how we understand our basic catechism that we teach to children for their first Holy Communion: for something to be gravely sinful, if the action is not intrinsically evil, there must be ill intent to do something we know and believe to be wrong, and we must do it freely. In civil law we would speak of mens rea and actus reus in a similar fashion. There must be a guilty mind, and a guilty act.

And cann. 1323-1324 list a long train of circumstances that remove or diminish that imputability: inculpable ignorance of the law or of the attached penalty, grave fear even if only relatively grave, necessity or grave inconvenience, diminished culpability from various causes.

None of this individualized assessment has been made, or could be made, in a document addressed to hundreds of priests at once. Can. 1720’s requirement of accusation, defence, and a case-specific finding “in law and in fact” is not optional when the numbers are large; if anything, the numbers make it more indispensable, not less. This is because an excommunication of almost a thousand clerics is a very grave matter, and it is untenable and, quite frankly, diabolical, to attempt to do so in a haphazard way that makes a mockery of the Law of the Church.

It is a disgrace.

The Note Itself Argues Against Automatic Lay Excommunication

The 2026 Note leans on a 1996 text from the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts (PCLT) addressing formal adherence to schism. That text was never raised to the level of authentic interpretation under can. 16 §1, which requires the legislator’s own act or a specific grant of that power; it remains a doctrinal opinion published in the PCLT’s bulletin.

The 1996 text’s content, in any case, cuts against blanket application. It requires a double element: an internal element, a genuinely schismatic will that places private judgment above obedience to the Roman Pontiff, and an external element, some act that manifests that will. Mere attendance at Society Masses, without embracing the underlying disciplinary rupture as one’s own, does not suffice; the PCLT text insists that each case be judged individually. A 2026 Note that imports these conditions cannot simultaneously produce the automatic, collective result being attributed to it.

Cardinal Fernández’s language that the Dicastery “makes its own” the 1996 text does not make any difference, because the Code is specific about what it takes to convert a document into binding law, and adopting a thirty-year-old opinion by reference does not suffice.

Can. 7 states the first requirement plainly: “A law is established when it is promulgated.”

Can. 8 §1 explains how this works: universal laws of the Church are promulgated by publication in the official Acta Apostolicae Sedis, and take effect only after the vacatio legis the canon prescribes, unless the law itself provides otherwise. An explanatory note published in a PDF, referencing an older document, is not a promulgation in this sense; nothing in the Decree or the Note purports to promulgate the 1996 text as universal law, and the ordinary channel for doing so was never used.

Vacatio legis, in the canonical system, means that after a law has been promulgated in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, a period of, generally, three months is required before it becomes binding, to ensure that it is properly known before it can bind the Church. Fernandez attempted to do this in the time it takes to send an email.

Can. 29 provides further clarification, since it governs the only category of instrument by which an executive dicastery could bind a “community capable of being governed by law” the way the Note attempts:

“General decrees are norms which are established for a community capable of being governed by law, by which the community itself is regulated.”

What This Means

A “general decree” is one of the specific instruments the Code recognizes for binding a community, sitting alongside — but distinct from — universal law proper. Three elements define it:

1. It’s issued for a community capable of being governed by law — not a single individual, but a defined group with the juridic capacity to be subject to legislation (a diocese, a religious institute, the universal Church, etc.).

2. It regulates that community as such — it lays down a general, common norm applying to everyone in the community by virtue of their membership in it, not a ruling addressed to a particular case or a particular person.

3. It is governed by the canons on laws — this is the operative consequence. Can. 29 doesn’t create a separate, looser category of norm-making; it expressly subjects general decrees to the same rules that govern laws. That means everything already discussed applies: promulgation (can. 7-8), the requirement of competent legislative authority, non-retroactivity absent express provision (can. 9), strict interpretation where penal or restrictive (can. 18), and so on.

So, to go after the whole group, they would have to essentially have them established as a juridically recognized body, and then take action following these norms. Again, if they want to excommunicate all of them, they have to do it the right way, or they don’t do it at all. That is, if they care about the law, which is not obvious.

Furthermore, if they were a juridically recognized group within the Church, then any talk of schism since 1988 would be even more laughable than it already is. In addition, to speak of them as being excommunicated and put into schism now, makes the claim that they have already been in schism just as laughable, as you cannot “kick out” someone who is not already in.

I will wait for all the commentators who have been crying “schism” for decades to issue apologies. Although I will probably be waiting longer for that than Maple Leaf fans have been waiting for a Stanley Cup.

In any event, can. 30 supports and adds a significant limitation:

“One who possesses only executive power is not able to issue the general decree mentioned in can. 29, unless in particular cases the competent legislator has expressly granted this power to him and the conditions established for the exercise of that power have been observed.”

The DDF possesses executive and doctrinal competence, not legislative competence; nothing in the Note recites a specific grant of legislative power from the Roman Pontiff for this act, and can. 30 makes such a grant, not mere reference, the condition for validity.

There is also the deeper structural point that governs how any curial document acquires the Pope’s own authority in the first place. A dicastery document carries the weight of an act of the Roman Pontiff himself only when it is specifically approved by him in forma specifica, meaning the Pope personally makes the content his own act of governance, as opposed to in forma communi, the ordinary approval given to routine business of a dicastery, which leaves the document as an act of the dicastery alone. The Note nowhere claims specifica approval; it claims that the Dicastery, of its own authority, “makes its own” a document from 1996 that was itself never more than a PCLT opinion. Adoption by reference, by a body exercising executive rather than legislative power, without the Pope’s specific personal act and without promulgation in the Acta, produces exactly nothing in the way of new law. It is the Dicastery restating an opinion it finds persuasive, not the Church legislating.

Can. 16 §1, already noted, confirms the same conclusion from the other direction: only the legislator, or one to whom the legislator has specifically granted that power, can authentically interpret a law so as to bind in its application. The Dicastery’s invocation of the 1996 text meets none of these tests, whether analyzed as an attempt at authentic interpretation, at a general decree, or at law simply. Whatever the Note is, it is not law, and Cardinal Fernández’s declaration that the Dicastery embraces its contents does not make it so.

Confessions and Marriages Rest on Different Canons Entirely

The validity of SSPX confessions and marriages does not turn on excommunication as such; it turns on faculty and delegation. Can. 966 §1 requires the faculty to absolve in addition to priestly orders; can. 1108 requires canonical form for marriage, ordinarily supplied through delegation. Both were supplied by papal act: Misericordia et misera n. 12 in 2016 for confession, and the 2017 Ecclesia Dei letter for marriage delegation.

Can. 21 holds that revocation of a prior law is never presumed in doubt, and a dicastery cannot derogate a papal act without specific papal approval to do so. The Note revokes neither grant by name.

Now, the Holy Father may release a document seeking to ratify what Fernandez has released. And, he may specifically revoke the faculties, which would be in keeping with the “Church of Mercy” he intends to continue after his predecessor.

Even if that happens, can. 144’s supplied jurisdiction in common error or positive and probable doubt would rescue the validity of sacraments received by the faithful acting in good faith, a contingency the Note does not so much as mention.

The Church supplies jurisdiction in cases of good-faith doubt or mistake. It can happen that one could entertain positive doubts about the scope or validity of the application of a certain law. A positive doubt occurs when you have a real, reasonable basis for doubt in a given situation. There may be something in a situation that gives a rational person grounds to be unsure. It is also the case that one could have a negative doubt, which is different than a positive doubt. A negative doubt is when one resorts to “what-if” in their consideration of a circumstance. This sort of doubt occurs often in people struggling with scrupulosity. “What if the priest didn’t actually say the right words when he absolved me?” “What if I wasn’t truly sorrowful for my sins and my confession is therefore invalid?” Etc. Negative doubt occurs in an atmosphere of endless hypothetical uncertainty that is not established in observable or verifiable circumstances.

In cases of negative doubt, this is a personal matter that a good priest would attribute either to your own nervousness or the devil, and these doubts should be ignored. However, in the case of positive doubts, we have real, concrete facts that cause uncertainty because something is unresolved, or at least unresolved to us. Where there is a real basis for positive doubt, because something in the life of the Church is unclear or ambiguous — such as the status of the SSPX throughout these decades of endless contradiction and confusion emanating from inconsistent statements about their legality — then what is legally required for something sacramental, like confession, is supplied. This is not meant to be a loophole, but is consistent with the aforementioned principles that ensure the Church governs justly and does not burden her subjects unnecessarily or unfairly.

Simply put, the situation in the Church is an insane mess, and if we will not get clarity or precision from our leaders, we cannot be expected to act in a way that is contrary to reason.

This applies to both priests and laymen. There are reasons for SSPX priests to have positive doubts about the legal status of the SSPX, for the myriad reasons discussed in a thousand places, including this essay, so they must make a choice and act in good conscience for the salvation of souls. In these cases, the Church, acting as a good Mother of souls, supplies the jurisdiction in cases of good-faith doubt, so that the sacrament works as it should for people approaching it sincerely, without requiring them to have resolved every background canonical question first. This is particularly relevant for the Society, considering that even for the priests and bishops, there remain clear and sound reasons for positive doubt, and there will remain such questions even after July 1, 2026, when more bishops are consecrated, because the canonical and doctrinal mess that has precipitated this situation is as far from being resolved as it has ever been.

Common Error is similar to the situation wherein a Positive Doubt exists, although slightly different. When we speak of Common Error, what we mean in the canonical tradition is that the situation is such that, even if one may be in error about a situation, the error about fact or law is such that the average man could hold the same opinion, even if erroneous.

Common Error exists when a normal, reasonable person in that situation would have made the same mistaken judgment. It is not about what you personally believe — it is about what the ordinary person, looking at the same circumstances, would have concluded. The question is not “were you unusually careless?” but “would any reasonable person have read the situation the same way?”

Regarding the Society, it is easy to see how one could be mistaken about a canonical fact, or, about the extent and scope of a law in a given circumstance, due to the nature of the situation. Now, this is not to say that I believe the Society is in error, or knows it is in error but proceeds anyway, but it is only to illustrate that even if it were in error, it is in line with the canonical tradition that, because the situation is confusing — even for high-ranking Churchmen — it is the case that errors can be held by men in good faith with no bad intentions.

Common Error is more for the faithful than for the priests. A concrete example would be if a priest without faculties, even a penalized priest, were to set up on a park bench with a sign saying “Confessions.” The random layman walking by would have no way of knowing what canonical state the priest was in, so the Church would supply the jurisdiction in that case for the good of the penitent. The culpability on behalf of the clergyman is another story, but the penitent needn’t worry.

In the case of the SSPX, the concepts of both Doubt and Common Error are applicable when we consider the history of marriages witnessed by Society priests.

The Precedent of Three Pontificates Backs the Conditional Reading

The 1988 affair supplies what we might call a control case, and it points in the same direction as the grammar of the Decree and the Note. When the Congregation for Bishops remitted the excommunications on January 21, 2009, it remitted them only for the four bishops consecrated that year, the only individuals who had ever actually been declared censured by name. Benedict XVI’s own letter of March 10, 2009, explaining that decision to the world’s bishops, placed the Society’s priests on an entirely different plane: irregular in canonical status, lacking legitimate ministry, but not himself describing them as excommunicated. Three pontificates now, across nearly forty years, have converged on the same restrictive practice: individual, declared censure for the consecrating bishops; a lesser, non-excommunicating irregularity for the priests. A 2026 Note asserting collective, present-tense excommunication of seven hundred clergy is not merely in tension with the Decree issued the same day; it breaks with the Church’s own consistent handling of this exact scenario since 1988.

What the Church Actually Did on July 1

Six men were named in the Decree. Everyone else, named — well merely referred to without name — only in a text that is not a law, not a decree, not a precept, and not a sentence; addressed collectively where the Code demands individual judgment; and silent on the very papal grants that would need to be revoked for the invalidity claims circulating to hold any water.

The Dicastery may yet correct this. A proper declaratory decree, individually addressed, following can. 1720, could still be issued against named priests. It has not been. Until it is, the sweeping claims of mass excommunication are not a conservative or cautious reading of what Rome has done; they are simply not what the text says. And, I am not sure if they have the manpower or the desire to issue either an extremely long decree with more than seven hundred names or more than seven hundred separate decrees, thus opening up almost a thousand potential appeals and rights to defence.

Speaking to a Canon Lawyer friend, he informed me that the Roman courts are backed up beyond belief, so I can’t see this happening any time soon, if ever.

Regarding the Recent Set of Documents Outlining the Procedure for Not Only SSPX Clerics, but Members of the Faithful to “return to full communion” with the Church

As was stated at the outset, we will discuss the recent documents released to supposedly aid priests and members of the faithful in returning to the Church.

Well, we needn’t spend any time doing that. Nothing happened to you, so nothing has changed. You are still simply Catholic, so spend more time praying for Fernandez et al than worrying about legal fictions.

Ultimately, these released documents change virtually nothing, even if read strictly and without any appeal to necessity. So, as they say, it is business as usual.

Kyrie Eleison